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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 900042-CA 
v. : 
DOUGLAS REED JONES, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a denial of a motion to withdraw 
a guilty plea to the charge of distribution of a controlled 
substance, a second degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction 
to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) 
(Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Whether the record as a whole establishes that 
defendant entered his guilty plea voluntarily? An appellate 
court "will not interfere with a trial judge's determination that 
a defendant has failed to show good cause [for withdrawal of a 
guilty plea] unless it clearly appears that the trial judge 
abused his discretion." State v. Mildenhallf 747 P.2d 422, 424 
(Utah 1987). 
2. Whether the record as a whole establishes that the 
judge made the necessary findings with respect to defendant's 
guilty plea? Icl. at 424 (same standard as above). 
3. Whether the record as a whole establishes that the 
judge made adequate inquiry into defendant's mental status? Id. 
at 424 (same standard as above). 
4. Whether the judge properly advised defendant that 
by pleading guilty he waived his right to cross-examine his 
accusers? Ld. at 424 (same standard as above). 
5. Whether the judge in determining voluntariness was 
required to review a possible affirmative defense? J*!' a t 4 2 4 
(same standard as above). 
6. Whether the judge properly advised defendant of the 
time period for a request to withdraw a guilty plea? ^d. at 424 
(same standard as above). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The relevant provisions relied upon by the State are 
set forth in the argument section of the brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with two counts of distribution 
of a controlled substance, both second degree felonies, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1989) and 
one count of being a habitual criminal, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-8-1001 (1990) (R. 7-10). Pursuant to a plea bargain 
agreement, defendant pled guilty on October 31, 1989 to one count 
of distribution of a controlled substance, a second degree 
felony, in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt 
Lake County, the Honorable Frank G. Noel, Judge, presiding (Tl. 
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7). On December 18, 1989, Judge Noel heard defendant's motion 
to withdraw his guilty plea (T2. 3). After a hearing, Judge Noel 
denied defendant's motion (T2. 48-50). Judge Noel sentenced 
defendant on January 9, 1990, to serve a term of one to fifteen 
years in the Utah State Prison (R. 113). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
According to the information, defendant sold cocaine to 
a police informant on December 11, 1987 and December 22, 1987 (R. 
7-8). Because defendant had previously been convicted of 
unrelated crimes, the information also charged defendant with 
being a habitual criminal (R. 8-9). 
On December 12, 1988, a preliminary hearing was held 
and defendant was bound over for trial. Defendant informed the 
court that he intended to rely on an entrapment defense (R. 61-
62). An entrapment hearing was scheduled for August 16, 1989 (R. 
78). At the hearing, the State made a motion to have defendant's 
attorney disqualified, since the attorney had previously 
represented the police informant in another criminal matter. 
Id. Defense counsel subsequently withdrew and new counsel was 
appointed (R. 80, 82). 
The transcript from the the guilty plea hearing is designated 
"Tl." The transcript from the hearing to withdraw the guilty 
plea is designated MT2." The record is designated "R." 
2 
The preliminary hearing transcript has not been made part of 
the record on appeal. 
The transcript of this hearing has not been made part of the 
record on appeal. 
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The entrapment hearing was rescheduled for October 31, 
4 
1989 (Tl. 1). On that date, defense counsel informed the trial 
court that a resolution of the case had been reached. Id. 
Defendant would plead guilty to one count of distribution of a 
controlled substance. Jd. In return, the State would dismiss 
the other two counts and would not charge defendant with any 
other crimes arising out of the investigation (Tl. 1, 6). 
Judge Noel went through the process of taking 
defendant's guilty plea. The judge started by asking defendant 
if he had reviewed the guilty plea affidavit with his counsel 
(Tl. 1) (See Appendix "A"; Statement of Defendant). Defendant 
indicated both that counsel had read the affidavit to him and 
that he had read the affidavit himself, ^d. In response to a 
follow-up question, defendant indicated he understood the 
affidavit "perfectly" (Tl. 2). In response to a series of 
questions from the bench, defendant told the court he knew he was 
giving up certain constitutional rights, including his right to a 
jury trial, his right to confront witnesses against him, his 
right to present his own evidence, and his alternative rights to 
either take the stand to testify on his own behalf or remain 
silent without being forced to testify. Ld. Defendant also 
stated, in response to questioning, that he understood that the 
State would be forced to prove its case without forcing defendant 
to testify. Id. 
The record indicates that the hearing was originally scheduled 
for October 10, 1989 (R. 86). The record is silent as to why the 
hearing actually occurred three weeks later. 
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Judge Noel asked defendant if he understood that by 
pleading guilty he was waiving his right to appeal and "all of 
these constitutional rights we just discussed" (Tl. 2-3). 
Defendant responded, "Yes, sir." (Tl. 3). The judge asked 
defendant to sign the plea affidavit (Tl. 3). Defendant agreed 
to do so. Ixi. At that point, defense counsel interjected 
herself into the judge's colloquy with defendant by stating, "Let 
me remind the court we must advise Mr. Jones about his rijgjit to 
withdraw his guilty plea. It is good for only 30 days." Id. 
After defendant signed the plea affidavit, Judge Noel 
reviewed the affidavit with him. First, the judge ensured that 
the affidavit accurately reflected defendant's age and 
educational background. Ld. Defendant affirmed that it did. 
Id. Next, Judge Noel asked if defendant understood the penalty 
for committing a second degree felony and that he could order the 
sentence to run either concurrently or consecutively with other 
sentences (Tl. 3-4). Once again, defendant gave an appropriate 
response (Tl. 4). In response to another question, defendant 
acknowledged that the judge was not bound by any recommendations 
with regard to sentencing. Id. 
Judge Noel summarized the offense charged in the 
information, setting forth the elements of distributing a 
controlled substance, and asked defendant if he understood those 
elements, j^ i. Once again, defendant responded appropriately. 
The judge asked defendant if he understood that by pleading 
guilty, the State would not be obligated to prove any of those 
elements, ^d. Defendant responded affirmatively. Id. 
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After discussing the statutory elements of distribution 
of a controlled substance, Judge Noel asked defendant if he 
agreed with and admitted to the facts alleged in the complaint 
that defendant, on December 11, 1987, in Salt Lake County, had 
sold one quarter of an ounce of cocaine to an undercover 
narcotics agent for $425 (Tl. 5). Defendant agreed that he had. 
Id. Defendant then waived a reading of the information. Id. 
Judge Noel asked defendant how he pled to the crime charged^. Id. 
Defendant responded, "Guilty." Id. 
Judge Noel asked defendant if he was entering the plea 
voluntarily, without force from any other person, and without any 
promises other than those contained in the guilty plea affidavit. 
(Tl. 5-6). Once again, defendant responded appropriately to all 
questions. I^ i. The judge asked defendant if he was under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs of any kind (Tl. 6). Defendant 
answered no. Id.. The judge asked defendant if he had any 
questions to ask the court. Id. Defendant indicated he did not. 
Id. 
Defense counsel interrupted at that point to say that 
the State had agreed not to file any additional charges as the 
result of the investigation. Jd. Judge Noel confirmed with the 
prosecutor that that was the agreement and asked defendant if he 
understood the agreement. Id. Defendant responded that he did 
(Tl. 7). 
Judge Noel then made an oral finding that "the plea has 
been freely and voluntarily made by the defendant." Id. He went 
on to ask two more questions of defendant, "I will advise you, 
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Mr. Jones, that if you intend to ask this court to allow you to 
withdraw this guilty plea that request must be made within 30 
days; do you understand that?" j^. To which, defendant 
responded "yes," I<i. Defendant's response was followed by a 
final question, "Your attorney has also mentioned [withdrawal of 
guilty pleas] here in court today, and I assume you discussed 
that with her?" Id.. Defendant responded that he had. Id. 
Judge Noel and counsel then discussed sentencing (Tl. 
7-8). During this discussion, defense counsel proffered 
defendant's concern about the conduct of the confidential 
informant (Tl. 8). 
On November 16, 1989, defendant filed a motion to set 
aside the guilty plea (R. 101). Judge Noel heard defendant's 
motion on December 16, 1989 (T2. 3). After a hearing, including 
testimony by defendant, Judge Noel denied defendant's motion (T2. 
5-31, 49-50). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant's guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily 
entered. The court made a detailed inquiry into whether 
defendant's plea was voluntary, giving both defendant and defense 
counsel an opportunity to consult and place objections on the 
record. The record as a whole, including the plea affidavit, 
comported with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Defendant's reliance on a strict compliance test is misplaced 
where the Utah Supreme Court has continued to apply a record as a 
whole test. 
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Specifically, the trial court made proper findings that 
defendant willingly and voluntarily entered his guilty pleas. 
Both the colloquy between defendant and the trial court and the 
plea affidavit demonstrate the voluntary nature of defendant's 
guilty plea. 
The trial court did not err in referring to defendant's 
right to "confront," as opposed to "cross examine," his accusers 
because the right to confrontation includes the right to cross-
examination. The record as a whole shows defendant's 
understanding of that right, particularly in light of language 
contained in the plea affidavit which uses the terms together. 
By pleading guilty, defendant waived his affirmative 
defense of entrapment and the trial court had no duty to explore 
his defense with him. Pleading guilty waives all non-
jurisdictional defects in the plea process. An affirmative 
defense is not a jurisdictional defect. 
Finally, the trial court properly advised defendant of 
his right to withdraw his guilty plea. Defense counsel's 
misinformation should be disregarded as invited error. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S PLEA WAS VOLUNTARY. 
Defendant claims that his guilty plea was not 
voluntarily entered because the trial court did not: (1) make 
appropriate findings under Rule 11(5) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, (2) explore defendant's mental condition, (3) 
tell defendant he had the right to cross-examine his accusers. 
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(4) explore the affirmative defense of entrapment with defendant, 
and (5) tell defendant that withdrawal of guilty pleas was within 
the sound discretion of the court. Each of these assertions is 
without merit and will be discussed in turn. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (1990) provides that a 
"plea of guilty . . . may be withdrawn only upon good cause shown 
and with leave of court." An appellate court "will not interfere 
with a trial judge's determination that a defendant has failed to 
show good cause unless it clearly appears that the trial judge 
abused his discretion." State v. Mildenhall, 747 P.2d 422, 424 
(Utah 1987) . 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure sets 
forth the procedures to be followed in entering a guilty plea: 
(5) The court may refuse to accept a plea of 
guilty or no contest, and may not accept the 
plea until the court has found: . . . 
(d) the defendant understands the nature 
and elements of the offense to which he is 
entering the plea; that upon trial the 
prosecution would have the burden of proving 
each of those elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt; and that the plea is an admission of 
all those elements. 
(e) the defendant knows the minimum and 
maximum sentence that may be imposed upon him 
for each offense to which a plea is entered, 
including the possibility of the imposition 
of consecutive sentences. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(5).5 
Defendant maintains that strict and not just 
substantial compliance with Rule 11 is required and any technical 
In 1989, the subsections in Utah R. Crim. P. 11 and Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-35-11 were redesignated so that the former Rule 11(e) 
and § 77-35-ll(e) are now Rule 11(5) and § 77-35-11(5). See 1989 
Utah Laws, ch. 62, § 2. Section 77-35-11 was repealed effective 
July 1, 1990. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-11 (Supp. 1989). 
-9-
failure to comply with Rule 11 necessitates setting aside the 
guilty plea. Defendant relies on State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 
(Utah 1987), where the Utah Supreme Court stated that "Rule 11 
squarely places on trial courts the burden of ensuring that 
constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements are complied with when 
a guilty plea is entered." jrd. at 1312. 
This Court's decisions in State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 
P.2d 92 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (1988), and 
State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (per 
curiam), support defendant's position that strict compliance with 
Rule 11 is required. In Vasilacopulos, this Court interpreted 
the Supreme Court's decision in Gibbons to have "effectively 
replaced the prior 'record as a whole' test with a strict Rule 
11(e) compliance test in accepting a defendant's guilty plea." 
Vasilacopulos, 776 P.2d at 94. However, Vasilacopulos and 
Valencia are inconsistent with recent decisions by the Utah 
Supreme Court and should be disavowed. 
Recently, in Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148 (Utah 
1989), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 751 (1990), the Utah Supreme 
Court found that although the trial court did not strictly comply 
with Rule 11 when Jolivet entered his plea, "'the absence of a 
finding under [section 77-35-11] is not critical so long as the 
record as a whole affirmatively establishes that the defendant 
entered his plea with full knowledge and understanding of the 
consequences and of the rights he was waiving.'" Jolivet# 784 
P.2d at 1149-50 (quoting State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 
1986) and citing Brooks v. Morris# 709 P.2d 310, 311 (Utah 1985); 
Warner v. Morris, 709 P.2d 309, 310 (Utah 1985)). 
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Prior to Jolivet, the Utah Supreme Court also applied 
the record as a whole test in State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 
(Utah 1988), stating: 
The United States Supreme Court has said, 
"[Tjhere is no adequate substitute for 
demonstrating in the record at the time the 
plea is entered the defendant's understanding 
of the nature of the charge against him." 
McCarthy fv. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 470 
(1969)] (emphasis in original). We think the 
most effective way to do this is to have a 
defendant state in his own words his 
understanding of the offense and the actions 
which make him guilty of the offense. By 
this statement, the trial court can assure 
itself that the defendant is truly submitting 
a voluntary and knowing plea. Moreover, the 
record on appeal will clearly reflect the 
defendant's understanding. Although this 
method is therefore preferable to others, it 
is not absolutely required. The test is 
voluntariness. 
Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1273 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
Copeland clearly states that strict Rule 11 compliance is not 
absolutely required when a guilty plea is otherwise voluntary. 
Id. Thus, substantial compliance is sufficient where the record 
establishes that the defendant pled voluntarily. See also State 
v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294, 1301-02 (Utah 1986) (technical Rule 11 
violations do not automatically invalidate an otherwise voluntary 
plea). Gibbons simply recommends the best method of determining 
the voluntariness of a plea, but does not impose a strict 
compliance test. 
This Court recently applied the record as a whole test 
to a post-Gibbons guilty plea, citing to, inter alia, Copeland, 
Jolivet, and Kay. State v. Thurston, 781 P.2d 1296, 1301 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). Thurston does not acknowledge either 
-11-
Vasilacopulos or Valencia, nor cite to Gibbons. Apparently, at 
least one panel of this Court has abandoned the strict compliance 
rule articulated in Vasilacopulos and Valencia, The Thurston 
Court correctly described the test as whether the record as a 
whole establishes that the plea was entered "with full knowledge 
and understanding of its consequences, and the rights [defendant] 
is waiving." Thurston, 781 P.2d at 1301. 
It may be argued that Copeland and Jolivet represent 
cases where the Utah Supreme Court was applying the record as a 
whole test only because the pleas were entered before Gibbons was 
decided. This argument gains some support from the Supreme 
Court's recent refusal to apply Gibbons to a pre-Gibbons plea on 
the theory that the Gibbons decision was a clear break from the 
past and consequently not retroactive. State v. Hickman, 779 
P.2d 670, 672 n.l (Utah 1989) (per curiam). 
Hickman, while somewhat troubling, is not 
determinative. First, Hickman is a per curiam decision which 
ignores that the Supreme Court applied the record as a whole test 
in Jolivet without distinguishing the case on the basis that it 
was a pre-Gibbons plea. Second, in Copeland, the Supreme Court 
did not even cite Gibbons, which suggests that the Court was not 
concerned that Gibbons might be inconsistent with the Copeland 
holding. Notably, the Jolivet Court did not state the date of 
Jolivet's plea and Copeland only mentioned in passing the date of 
Copeland's plea without assigning any particular significance to 
Hickman predates Jolivet since Hickman was issued August 17, 
1989 and Jolivet was issued August 22, 1989. 
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the date. The Utah Supreme Court's willingness to apply the 
record as a whole test in Jolivet and Copeland without further 
explanation indicates that the test is voluntariness, not strict 
Rule 11 compliance, regardless of whether a pre- or post-Gibbons 
plea is in issue. Finally, were it otherwise, it seems Miller, 
Kay, Brooks, and Warner would be specifically overruled or 
limited in their application to pre-Gibbons cases. Since these 
cases have neither been overruled nor limited, the record as a 
whole approach seems applicable in both pre- and post-Gibbons 
cases, as it logically should. 
Applying the record as a whole standard in the present 
case, the lower court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Before accepting 
the plea, the trial judge and defendant entered into the 
following colloquy: 
The Court: You are Douglas Reed Jones? 
The defendant: Yes, sir. 
The Court: Mr. Jones, have you reviewed a statement 
with your attorney here today? 
The defendant: Yes, sir, she read it to me and I read 
it myself. 
The Court: You understand that that lists certain 
constitutional rights you have in connection with these 
proceedings. Did you discuss those? 
The defendant: Yes, I did. 
The Court: You understand then that you have a right 
to a jury trial on these charges? 
The defendant: Yes, sir. 
The Court: You have the right to confront any 
witnesses presented against you by the State? 
-13-
The defendant: Yes, sir. 
The Court: You have the right to present evidence of 
your own? 
The defendant: Yes. 
The Court: You would also have the right to take the 
stand and testify on your own behalf, or you would also 
have the right to remain silent and could not be forced 
to testify? 
The defendant: Yes, sir. 
The Court: . The State would be required to prove their 
case without any testimony from you, do you understand 
that? 
The defendant: Yes, sir. 
The Court: If you were convicted of these charges, you 
would have the right to appeal that conviction. If you 
plead guilty today you'll give up all of these 
Constitutional rights we just discussed; are you aware 
of that? 
The defendant: Yes, sir. 
The Court: Are you willing to sign the statement? 
The defendant: Yes, sir. 
The Court: Would you do so at this time? 
Ms. Mower [defense counsel]: Let me remind the Court 
we must advise Mr. Jones about his right to withdraw 
his guilty plea. It is good for only 30 days. 
The Court: Certainly, I intend to do that. 
Ms. Mower: Perhaps the record should reflect I'm 
dating it for Mr. Jones, and Miss Huffnagle [the 
prosecutor] and I have previously signed the affidavit. 
The Court: All right, Mr. Jones, this statement that 
you've just signed indicates that you're 34 years of 
age and completed 13 years of schooling; is that 
correct? 
The defendant: Yes, sir. 
The Court: You've been charged with a second degree 
felony. Do you understand that carries a penalty from 
one to [15] years in the Utah State Prison and up to a 
$10,000 fine, plus 25 percent surcharge? 
-14-
The defendant: Yes, sir. 
The Court: Now, do you also understand that the Court 
could impose that sentence and require that it run 
consecutive to any other sentence that you might now be 
serving? 
The defendant: Yes, sir. 
The Court: There will probably be recommendations made 
to this Court with regard to sentencing, but you 
understand the Court is not bound by any recommendation 
and could require that that sentence run consecutive 
[sic]? 
The defendant: Yes, sir. 
The Court: The elements of this offense with which 
you've been charged are that you intentionally 
distributed a controlled substance, to wit, cocaine. 
In order for you to be convicted of this offense, the 
State would be required to provide each and everyone 
[sic] of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Do 
you understand that? 
The defendant: Yes. 
The Court: However, if you plead guilty today the 
State will not be required to make that proof, you'll 
be convicted of that charge by your own admission; do 
you understand that? 
The defendant: Yes, sir. 
The Court: They allege as facts to support this charge 
on December 11, 1987, you sold one quarter ounce of 
cocaine to an undercover narcotics agent for $425.00, 
in Salt Lake City, Utah. Do you understand that if you 
plead guilty you'll be admitting those facts? 
The defendant: Yes, sir. 
The Court: Do you waive formal reading of the 
information, counsel? 
Ms. Mower: We would. 
The Court: You've been charged under Count One with 
unlawful distribution, offering, agreeing, consenting 
or arranging to distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance, a second degree felony, in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, on or about are (sic) December 11, 1987, 
to wit, cocaine. How do you plead to that charge? 
-15-
The defendant: Guilty. 
The Court: Are you entering that plea voluntarily? 
The defendant: Yes, sir. 
The Court: Nobody is forcing you to do so? 
The defendant: No. 
The Court: Has anybody made any promises to you as to 
what the sentence of the court might be? 
The defendant: Only what the paper said. 
Th£ Courl:: And that is—let me just take a look at it. 
The defendant: They would recommend Counts Two and 
Three were [sic] dropped, that was all. 
The Court: Okay. 
Ms. Mower: That's correct. 
The Court: The only representation that's been made if 
you plead guilty is then the other charges will be 
dropped? 
The defendant: Yes, sir. 
The Court: Mr. Jones, are you presently under the 
influence of any alcohol or drugs of any kind? 
The defendant: No. 
The Court: Do you have any questions whatsoever about 
these proceedings that you want to ask the Court? 
The defendant: No, sir. 
Ms. Mower: Your honor, we have one addendum to that 
plea bargain. The State would also agree not to file 
any additional charges which it could have brought as a 
result of this investigation. There's a potential, I 
believe, of one or perhaps two other charges. Those 
will not be filed, but they arise out of this 
investigation with this informant. 
The Court: Is that correct? 
Ms. Huffnagle: That's correct. 
The Court: Do you understand that, Mr. Jones? 
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The defendant: Yes, I understand. 
The Court: The Court finds that the plea has been 
freely and voluntarily made by the defendant. The 
Court will sign the statement so indicating. And I 
will advise you, Mr. Jones, that if you intend to ask 
this Court to allow you to withdraw this guilty plea 
that request must be made within 30 days; do you 
understand that? 
The defendant: Yes, sir. 
The Court: All right. 
(Tl. 1-7).7 
The plea affidavit executed by defendant also contains 
the various constitutional rights waived by defendant's guilty 
plea, as well as the same information secured by Judge Noel in 
his colloquy with defendant. (See Appendix "A"; Statement of 
Defendant). The record as a whole shows not only compliance with 
Rule 11, but a conscientious effort by the Judge Noel to ensure 
that defendant knew the consequences of pleading guilty to the 
crime charged. 
POINT II 
THE JUDGEG MADE PROPER FINDINGS. 
Defendant claims the trial court did not make proper 
findings as required by Rule 11. Defendant's claim should be 
summarily rejected. 
Defendant cites Gibbons for the proposition that "Rule 
11(e) squarely places on trial Courts the burden of ensuring that 
Constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements are complied with when 
a guilty plea is entered." Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312. Likewise, 
7 
The State maintains that even if this Court uses a strict 
compliance test, the on the record colloquy between defendant and 
Judge Noel shows strict compliance with Rule 11. 
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defendant cites Valencia for the statement that "[s]trict, and 
not just substantial compliance with the rule is required." 
o 
Valencia, 776 P.2d at 1334. However, the Gibbons and Valencia 
quotes are taken out context. Taken in context, both quotes 
require that the defendant fully understand his rights waived by 
a guilty plea, but do not require specific findings by the trial 
judge on each right. 
As the Utah Supreme Court said in Jolivet, " ' the.. 
absence of a finding under [section 77-35-11] is not critical so 
long as the record as a whole affirmatively establishes that the 
defendant entered his plea with full knowledge and understanding 
of its consequences and the rights he was waiving.'" Jolivet, 
784 P.2d at 1149 (quoting State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403, 405 
(Utah 1986) and citing Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310, 311 (Utah 
1985); Warner v. Morris, 709 P.2d 309, 310 (Utah 1985)). 
Defendant claims the only finding made by Judge Noel 
was "that the plea has been freely and voluntarily made by 
defendant" (Tl. 7). However, this misstates the facts. The 
entire colloquy as well as the plea affidavit served as a basis 
for ensuring defendant knew what rights he was waiving, the 
elements and factual allegations of the crime defendant had been 
charged with, and that defendant made his plea of his own 
volition. By asking each question, Judge Noel followed Rule 11 
procedure in satisfying himself that defendant knew the 
consequences of his plea. The judge's questioning sets forth not 
p 
The State repeats its assertion that Valencia has limited 
viability since the decision misinterpreted Gibbons. See Point 
I, supra. 
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only the elements of the crime for which defendant was charged, 
but also summarized the specific acts defendant was accused of 
committing. See State v. Copeland# 765 P.2d 1266, 1273 (Utah 
1988) (approving of a trial judge's explanation to the defendant 
setting forth both the elements of the crime and defendant's 
criminal conduct). The plea affidavit also establishes that 
defendant entered the plea voluntarily (R. 93). (See Appendix 
"A"; Statement of Defendant). Based upon the affidavit and 
colloquy, Judge Noel found the guilty plea freely and voluntarily 
made (R. 98). Thus the requirements for a voluntary guilty plea 
have been met. 
POINT III 
THE JUDGE MADE SUFFICIENT INQUIRY INTO 
DEFENDANT'S MENTAL STATE AT THE TIME HE 
ACCEPTED DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA. 
Defendant claims that Judge Noel should have asked 
defendant whether he was suffering from any mental disease or 
defect which would impair his ability to make a knowing and 
voluntary guilty plea. Defendant's claim is without substance. 
Notably, defendant cites no authority for his claim 
that the trial judge is required to inquire into a defendant's 
mental status at the time of a guilty plea. Rule 11 only 
requires that "the plea is voluntarily made." Utah R. Crim. P. 
11(5)(b). In any event, by asking defendant if he was under the 
influence of drugs or alcohol, Judge Noel assured himself that 
defendant was mentally aware of the plea proceedings. 
Defendant further claims that the judge should have 
known about defendant's placement in an isolation cell and should 
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have questioned him about it. However, nothing in the record 
indicates Judge Noel knew defendant was in isolation at the time 
defendant entered his guilty plea. Either defendant or counsel 
could have mentioned the isolation status to the judge at the 
time defendant entered his guilty plea. Neither did. The plea 
affidavit includes defense counsel's certification that she 
believed defendant was both physically and mentally competent to 
understand the meaning of the contents of the affidavit (R. 97) 
(See Appendix "A", Statement of Defendant). Defense counsel 
should not be allowed to portray defendant as mentally competent 
at the time the plea is entered and later claim incompetence in 
an attempt to renege on the plea bargain agreement. 
In any event, Judge Noel rejected defendant's self-
serving testimony that the plea was involuntary because defendant 
was allegedly confused, downhearted, and depressed (T2. 48-50). 
These symptoms are not surprising in light of the serious trouble 
defendant was in at the time of the plea. If these alleged 
symptoms alone are sufficient grounds to set aside an otherwise 
voluntary guilty plea, there would be few sustainable guilty 
pleas. 
POINT IV 
THE JUDGE PROPERLY INFORMED DEFENDANT ABOUT 
HIS RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION. 
Defendant claims that the judge did not tell him of his 
right to "cross-examine" his accusers. This claim has no merit. 
Courts have long held that the right to confrontation 
includes the right of cross-examination. As the United States 
Supreme Court has stated, "The main purpose of the confrontation 
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is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-
examination. - Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974) 
(quoting 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1395, p. 123 (3d ed. 1940)) 
(emphasis in original). Accord Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 
673, 678 (1986). See also Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 
(1965). 
The Utah Supreme Court has agreed that the right of 
cross-examination is included in the confrontation clauses of 
both the United States and Utah Constitutions. State v. Maestas, 
564 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Utah 1977). See also State v. Hyqh, 711 
P.2d 264, 271 (Utah 1985). As the Utah Supreme Court said in 
another case, "Certainly, disallowing a criminal defendant a fair 
opportunity to expose a witness' bias or motivation in testifying 
may infringe upon the defendant's constitutionally protected 
right of confrontation." State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 204 
(Utah 1987). 
In the present case, the record clearly establishes 
that defendant was informed of his confrontation rights. 
Defendant's plea affidavit states, "I know that if I wish to have 
a trial I have the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses 
against me or to have them cross-examined by my attorney" (R. 94) 
(See Appendix "A"; Statement of Defendant) (emphasis added). 
This statement alone shows that defendant knew he was waiving his 
right to cross-examine his accusers. 
Additionally, the on-the-record colloquy also shows 
defendant's understanding of this right. At the guilty plea 
hearing, Judge Noel asked, "You have the right to confront any 
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witnesses presented against you by the state?" To which 
defendant responded, "Yes, sir." (Tl. 2). While the judge's 
question does not specifically mention the word "cross-examine," 
the absence of this word is a distinction without a difference. 
POINT V 
THE JUDGE WAS NOT REQUIRED TO INFORM 
DEFENDANT THAT BY PLEADING GUILTY HE WAS 
WAIVING HIS AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF 
ENTRAPMENT. 
Defendant next complains that Judge Noel should-have 
inquired about his entrapment defense. Since no such inquiry is 
required, no error occurred and defendant's claim should be 
rejected. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that a guilty plea 
waives all non-jurisdictional defects and admits all of the 
essential elements of the crime. State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 
1275, 1278 (Utah 1989). Likewise, the United States Supreme 
Court has held that a defendant is precluded from alleging denial 
of constitutional rights which occurred prior to the entry of a 
voluntary and intelligent guilty plea. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 
U.S. 258, 267 (1973). In this case, entrapment is an affirmative 
defense which is statutorily provided for under Utah Code Ann. § 
76-2-303(1) (Supp. 1989). As the Supreme Court said in Tollett: 
When a criminal defendant has solemnly 
admitted in open court that he is in fact 
guilty of the offense with which he is 
charged, he may not thereafter raise 
independent claims relating to the 
deprivation of constitutional rights that 
occurred prior to the entry of the guilty 
plea. He may only attack the voluntary and 
the intelligent character of the guilty plea 
by showing that the advice he received from 
counsel was not within the standards set 
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forth in McMann [v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 
770 (1970)]. 
Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267. £f. United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 
715, 718-19 (2d Cir. 1965), cert, denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1965) (a 
plea of guilty is an admission of guilt and a waiver of all 
nonjurisdictional defects). See also United States v. DePolif 
628 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Lopez, 704 F.2d 
1382 (5th Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 935 (1983); State v. 
Sery, -758. P. 2d 935-, 938 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Some courts have permitted a defendant to avoid the 
waiver doctrine by allowing a defendant to enter a conditional 
guilty plea expressly preserving specific issues for appeal with 
the consent of the judge and prosecutor. State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 
935, 938 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); People v. Reid, 420 Mich. 326, 362 
N.W.2d 655 (1984); State v. Crosby, 338 So.2d 584 (La. 1976). A 
conditional plea nullifies the general rule of waiver and allows 
a defendant to withdraw his plea in the event he is successful on 
appeal. Sery, 758 P.2d at 938. 
In the instant case, defendant did not enter a 
9 
conditional guilty plea. Defense counsel told the court, "It's 
our intent to enter a plea to count one as charged in the 
information, that would be distribution of a controlled 
substance. And upon the taking of our plea, the State would move 
to dismiss count two and count three" (Tl. 1). The only 
"condition" apparent in defense counsel's statement is that the 
9 
If defendant was concerned about his entrapment defense, 
nothing in the record indicates why he could not have proceeded 
with the entrapment hearing before pleading guilty. Waiving the 
entrapment hearing by pleading guilty was defendant's choice. 
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State would dismiss the other two counts against defendant. 
Defendant misstates the record when he claims that 
defense counsel brought the issue to the court's attention at the 
time of the plea (Br. of App. at 18-19). In fact, a close 
reading of the record indicates that defense counsel first 
mentioned the entrapment defense after Judge Noel accepted the 
guilty plea. Defense counsel then changed the subject to discuss 
sentencing (Tl. 7). All of defense counsel's statements relied 
upon by defendant go to the sentence the court might impose, not 
the nature of defendant's guilty plea. 
Noticeably, defendant fails to cite any authority which 
requires a judge to notify a defendant that all affirmative 
defenses are waived by an unconditional guilty plea. Such a 
requirement could place an impossible burden on the court to 
discover possible defenses just to inform the defendant that they 
will become moot by the guilty plea. In any event, the record is 
clear that defendant was aware of his possible entrapment defense 
since he chose to forego the entrapment hearing in order to plead 
guilty. Since the plea was voluntary, this Court should allow it 
to stand. 
During the plea process, defense counsel and the prosecutor 
also agreed, and defendant acknowledged understanding, that the 
State would file no additional charges as a result of its 
investigation (Tl. 6). 
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POINT VI 
THE JUDGE PROPERLY INFORMED DEFENDANT OF THE 
TIME LIMITATIONS AND CONDITIONAL NATURE OF A 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW A GUILTY PLEA. 
Finally, defendant complains that Judge Noel left him 
with the false impression that he could withdraw his guilty plea, 
by right, within 30 days of entering it. Defendant's claim must 
fail. 
Rule 11(5) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
provides that the court may not accept a guilty plea until the 
court has found that "the defendant has been advised of the time 
limits for filing any motion to withdraw a guilty plea or no 
contest." The rule does not require the court to explain to a 
defendant that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea will only be 
granted upon a showing of "good cause" under Utah Code Ann. § 77-
13-6(2)(a) (1990) . 
Yet, defendant claims that statements by his counsel, 
in conjunction with those of the court, created confusion (Br. of 
App. at 21). However, the statements by Judge Noel were quite 
clear, carefully couched in words of limitation and permission. 
Judge Noel told defendant, "And I will advise you, Mr. Jones, 
that if you intend to ask this court to allow you to withdraw 
this guilty plea that request must be made within 30 days; do you 
understand that?" (Tl. 7) (emphasis added). Nothing in that 
phrase can be construed as telling defendant he has an unlimited 
right to withdraw his guilty plea within the 30-day period. 
Judge Noel's explanation to defendant complied with Rule 11(5) 
that defendant must be informed of the time limits for filing a 
motion to withdraw. 
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During the hearing on the motion to withdraw the guilty 
pleaf Judge Noel rejected defense counsel's attempt to impose her 
misstatements on the court. During that hearing, the following 
discussion ensued: 
Ms, Mower (Defense counsel is reading from 
the transcript of the guilty plea hearing): 
"Miss Mower: Let me remind the Court that we 
must advise Mr. Jones about his right to 
withdraw his guilty plea. It is good for 
only 30 days." The Court then goes through 
the affidavit and some of the rights that are 
contained in that affidavit, and later on the 
Court repeats that statement. 
The Court: I don't repeat it in that way. I 
specifically stated, page 7, "If you intend 
to ask this Court to allow you to withdraw 
your guilty plea, then that request must be 
made within 30 days." 
Ms. Mower: That's correct. And the Court 
reinforces that, Yes, we have to advise you 
you have 30 days in which to request the 
withdrawal. 
The Court: That's right, and that's what I'm 
bound by law to do. 
(T2. 34). Judge Noel denied defendant's motion finding that he 
had complied with "all requirements and rules of law" (R. 112) 
(See Appendix "B"; Minute Entry); (T2. 48-50) (See Appendix "C"; 
Transcript Excerpts). 
As for defendant's claim that defense counsel helped 
create the confusion, this Court should reject that assertion 
under the doctrine of invited error which the Utah Supreme Court 
has held "is procedurally unjustified and viewed with disfavor. . 
• ." State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 547, 560 (Utah 1987). As the 
Ironically, counsel on appeal was also defense counsel at the 
plea hearing and motion to withdraw hearing. 
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Supreme Court noted in another case, "To rule otherwise would 
permit a defendant in a criminal case to 'invite' prejudicial 
error and implant it in the record as a form of appellate 
insurance against an adverse sentence," State v. Parsons, 781 
P.2d 1275, 1285 (Utah 1989). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the lower court's order denying 
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea should be 
affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this i ^ day of August, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DAN R. LARSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
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STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
Criminal No. 
COMES NOW, the defendant in this 
case and hereby acknowledges and certifies the following: 








I have received a copy of the (c^arae 
against me, I have read i t , and I understand the natu^e""""?^ 
elements of the of fense(W for which I am pleading' ( g u i l t y $10 
corniest). ' 
u i> «^ *. *~+ »**-" 
The elements of the crimeCf) of which I am charged are as 
follows: 
P ) "T>/sr&6i/77J7^ 
3J o^A- (U/^muA\ bu&<n\^sOf 
</) C<£fitsJ£ 
My conduct, and the conduct of other persons for which I 
am criminally liable, that constitutes the elements of the 
c r i m e ^ charged are as follows: £>AJ /)ffl. /^/fft7 -J- SoLj) 
><>2 I am entering this/the^s^ plea(jjrt voluntarily and with 
knowledge and understanding of the following facts: 
1. I know that I have the right to be represented by an 
attorney and that if I cannot afford one, an attorney will be 
appointed by the court at no cost to me. 
2. 3^(have not}> (ftay^ ) waived my right to counsel. If I 
have waived my right to counsel, I have done so knowingly, 
intelligently and voluntarily because of the following 
reasons: 
3. If I have waived my right to counsel, I have read 
this statement and understand the nature and elements of the 
charges, my rights in this and other proceedings and the 
consequences of my plea of guilty. 
_ 1 -
4. If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney 
_, and I have had an opportunity to 
discuss this statement, my rights and the consequences of my 
guilty plea with my attorney. 
5. I know that I have a right to a trial by jury. 
6. I know that if I wish to have a trial I have the 
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against me or to 
have them cross-examined by my attorney. I also know that I 
have the right to have my witnesses subpoenaed at state expense 
to testify in court upon my behalf. 
7. I know that I have a right to testify in my own 
behalf but if I choose not to do so I can not be compelled to 
testify or give evidence against myself and no adverse 
inferences will be drawn against me if I do not testify. 
8. I know that if I wish to contest the charge against 
me I need only plead "not guiltyM and the matter will be set 
for trial, at which time the State of Utah will have the burden 
of proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable 
doubt. If the trial is before a jury the verdict must be 
unanimous. 
9. I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I 
were tried and convicted by a jury or by the judge that I would 
have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah 
Court of Appeals or# where allowed, to the Supreme Court of 
Utah and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such 
appeal, those costs would be paid by the state. 
10. I know that the maximum possible sentence may be 
imposed upon my plea of guilty, and that sentence may be for a 
- 3 -
prison term, fine, or both. I know that in addition to any 
fine, a ^ S % surcharge, required by Utah Code Annotated 
63-63-9, will be imposed. I also know that I may be ordered by 
the court to make restitution to any victim or victims of my 
crimes. 
11. I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive 
periods, or the fine for additional amounts, if my plea is to 
more than one charge. I also know that if I am on probation, 
parole or awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I 
have been convicted or to which I have pleaded guilty, my plea 
in the present action may result in consecutive sentences being 
imposed upon me. 
.12. I know and understand that by pleading /(guilt^ J^np 
conifest) I am waiving my statutory and constitutional rights 
set out in the preceding paragraphs. I also know that by 
entering such plea^X) I am admitting and do so admit that I 
have committed the conduct alleged and I am guilty of the 
crimeuk) for which my pleaQs) ls/3)^ entered. 
13. My plea(& of /(guilty) J ( & 6 6 o h ^ s t ) (Q>iY n^£ the 
result of a plea bargain""b€'€ween myself and the prosecuting 
attorney. The promises, duties and provisions of this plea 
bargain, if any, are fully contained in the Plea Agreement 
attached to this affidavit. 
14. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a 
reduction of the charges for sentencing made or sought by 
either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not 
binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they 
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express to me as to what they believe the court may do are also 
not binding on the court. 
15. No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any 
kind have been made to induce me to plead guilty, and no 
promises except, those contained herein and in the attached 
plea agreement, have been made to me. 
16. I have read this statement or I have had it read to 
me by my attorney, and I understand its provisions. I know 
that I am free to change or delete anything contained in this 
affidavit. I do not wish to make any changes because all of-
the statements are correct. 
17. I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my 
attorney. 
18. I am y \ years of age; I have attended school 
through the ade and I can read and understand the 
English language. I was not under the influence of any drugs, 
medication or intoxicants when the decision to enter the 
plea(V> was made. I am not presently under the influence of 
any drugs, medication or intoxicants. 
19. I believe myself to be of a sound and discerning 
mind, mentally capable of understanding the proceedings and the 
consequences of my plea and free of any mental disease, defect 
or impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, 
intelligently and voluntarily entering my plea. 
DATED this i^*~~ dav of 
e f e n d a n t T 7 7 ^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for 
the defendant above, and that I know he/sift* has read the 
statement or that I have read it to him/het and I have 
discussed it with him/hVr and believe that he/siW fully 
understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and 
physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief 
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the 
crimeCsJ) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal 
conduct are correctly stated and these, along with the other 
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the 
foregoing affidavit, are accurate^nd /true. 
fney/for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in 
the case against ., defendant. I have 
reviewed this statement of the defendant and find that the 
declarations, including the elements of the offense of the 
charge(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal 
conduct which constitutes the offense are true and correct* No 
improper inducements, threats or coercion to encourage a plea 
have been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully 
contained in the statement and in the attached plea agreement 
or as supplemented on record before the court. There is 
reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the 
conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the 
- 6 -
V; is 'w ~l •*-* r 
plea(s) is/are entered and acceptance of the plea(s) would 
serve the public interest. 
ORDER 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing statement 
and certif ication, the court finds the defendants plea of 
guilty is freely and voluntarily made and j.t is so ordered that 
the defendants plea OJ 
set forth in the statement be accepted and entered. 
O^c^n^est) to the chargeOsQ 





IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
JONES, DOUGLAS REED 
JAIL FEDERAL HOLD 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 881991656 FS 
DATE 12/18/89 
HONORABLE FRANK G NOEL 
COURT REPORTER CREED BARKER 
COURT CLERK PAJ 
TYPE OF HEARING: MOTION HEARING 
PRESENT: DEFENDANT 
P. ATTY. HUFNAGEL, WENDY 
D. ATTY. MOWER, CONNIE 
DEFT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA COMES NOW ON 
REGUARLY BEFORE THE COURT FOR HEARING. 
DOUGLAS JONES IS SWORN AND EXAMINED IN HIS OWN BEHALF. 
THE MOTION IS ARGUED TO THE COURT BY RESPECTIVE COUNSEL AND 
SUBMITTED. 
THE COURT FINDS THAT DEFT'S PLEA WAS VOLUNTARY. ALL RE-
QUIRMENTS AND RULES OF LAW WERE MET. THE COURT FINDS THAT THE 
DEFT UNDERSTOOD ALL OF HIS RIGHT AND VOLUNTARILY ENTERED A PLEA 
OF GUILTY. DEFT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA IS DENIED. 
DEFT'S SENTENCING IS SET FOR JAN. 5, 1990 AT 10:30 A.M. 
APPENDIX C 
1 THAT SAYS YOU MUST ADVISE THEM OF DEFENSES. RIGHT, NOTHING 
2 IN THERE SAYS THAT. BUT I THINK IT DOES RELATE TO 
3 KNOWINGNESS OF THE PLEA, KNOWINGLY ENTERING A PLEA. 
4 COUNSEL ALSO ARGUES THAT WOULD JUST BE TOO 
5 ENCUMBERING ON THE COURT TO REQUIRE THE COURT TO TAKE THE 
6 DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT AT THE TIME THAT HE'S CHANGING HIS 
7 PLEA AND EVALUATE THAT STATEMENT ON THE RECORD. TO THE 
8 CONTRARY, FEDERAL RULE 11 REQUIRES PRECISELY THAT. IT'S A 
9 LITTLE MORE DETAILED. AND WITH THE CHANGE OF PLEAS IN THE 
10 FEDERAL COURT EVERY DEFENDANT IS SWORN IN, EVERY DEFENDANT 
11 MAKES A STATEMENT ON THE RECORD WHICH IS EVALUATED BY THE 
12 COURT AT THE TIME OF THE TAKING OF THE PLEA. AND OUR 
13 FEDERAL SYSTEM HASN'T COLLAPSED YET. THAT ADDITIONAL 
14 REQUIREMENT OF BEING THAT THOROUGH AT THE TIME OF THE 
15 TAKING OF THE PLEA IS NOT GOING TO HARM THE COURT. IT MAY 
16 TAKE A COUPLE MORE MINUTES, BUT I THINK IT'S IMPORTANT AND 
17 ESPECIALLY IN A CASE LIKE THIS WHERE THERE WAS AN APPARENT 
18 DEFENSE THAT WAS HEARD, AND THERE WAS AN ENTRY OF A PLEA. 
19 WE NEED TO KNOW WHAT THE DEFENDANT'S UNDERSTANDING WAS OF 
20 THAT DEFENSE, AND WE NEED IT ON THE RECORD AND WE DON'T 
21 HAVE IT. 
22 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THE COURT WILL MAKE 
23 THESE OBSERVATIONS AND I AM GOING TO RULE ON THIS CASE 
24 TODAY. REGARDLESS OF THE TIME IT TAKES TO RECEIVE A PLEA, 
25 THE COURT NECESSARILY HAS TO TAKE THAT TIME TO ENSURE THAT 
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1 IT'S BEEN DONE VOLUNTARILY. I DON'T THINK THERE'S ANY 
2 QUESTION ABOUT THAT. THE SUPREME COURT IS SENSITIVE TO 
3 THAT, AND IT'S TOLD US TO TAKE THE TIME. 
4 IN THIS CASE, THE COURT IS CONVINCED THAT THE 
5 PLEA WAS VOLUNTARY. IN ORDER TO DETERMINE VOLUNTARINESS, 
6 THE COURT HAS TO OBVIOUSLY QUESTION THE DEFENDANT. BUT 
7 IT'S TOO EASY IN MY MIND FOR A DEFENDANT TO COME BACK LATER 
8 AND SAY SUBJECTIVELY: I DIDN'T UNDERSTAND THIS OR DIDN'T 
9 UNDERSTAND THAT. THE COURT HAS TO LOOK AT THE RECORD, 
10 TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND MAKE SURE ALL OF THE 
11 REQUIREMENTS OF THE LAW ARE MET, AND THEN MAKE A FINDING. 
12 THE COURT MADE THAT FINDING THAT THE PLEA WAS VOLUNTARY. I 
13 THINK ALL OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE LAW AND THE RULES WERE 
14 MET. I DON'T THINK THAT THE RULES REQUIRE THAT THE 
15 ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE BE DISCUSSED. I SUPPOSE IF THE 
16 APPELLATE COURT FEELS IT SHOULD HAVE HKKN THEN THEY CAN SO 
17 INDICATE, IF THIS MATTER IS APPEALED. BUT I DON'T THINK AT 
18 THIS POINT THAT IS A NECESSARY REQUIREMENT. THE COURT WAS 
19 CONVINCED THEN AND IS CONVINCED NOW IT WAS VOLUNTARILY 
20 ENTERED. 
21 THERE'S THE QUESTJ ON ABOUT THE 30 DAY 
22 WITHDRAWAL PROVISION. THE COURT JUST FEELS IT IS NOT 
23 BELIEVABLE THAT MR. JONES WOULD FEEL THAT WHAT WE WENT 
24 THROUGH AT THE TIME OF THE RECEIVING OF THE PLEA DIDN'T 
25 MEAN ANYTHING, IN THAT SIMPLY IF HE GOT BUYER'S REMORSE HE 
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1 COULD CHANGE HIS MIND AND COME BACK WITHIN 30 DAYS. AND 
2 THE COURT SAID HE COULD REQUEST THAT THE COURT ALLOW HIS 
3 GUILTY PLEA BE WITHDRAWN AND I SPECIFICALLY WORDED IT THAT 
4 WAY. I NEVER TELL A DEFENDANT HE HAS A RIGHT TO WITHDRAW 
5 HIS GUILTY PLEA. BUT THEN IF HE IS GOING TO ASK THE COURT 
6 TO ALLOW HIM TO DO IT, HE HAS TO MAKE THE REQUEST. AND AS 
7 I SAY, I'M GOING TO FIND ~ I THINK THAT THERE WAS SOME 
8 EVIDENCE HERE TODAY AND THE COURT NEEDS TO MAKE A FINDING. 
9 THE COURT IS GOING TO FIND NOW AS IT DID AT THE 
10 TIME THE PLEA WAS ENTERED, THAT THE PLEA WAS VOLUNTARY AND 
11 THE DEFENDANT UNDERSTOOD HIS RIGHTS. THE TECHNICAL 
12 VIOLATION YOU MENTIONED WITH REGARD TO THE RIGHT TO 
13 CROSS-EXAMINATION, ALL OF HIS RIGHTS, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
14 WERE STATED, INCLUDING THE RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION, THERE 
15 MAY BE SOME VERY TECHNICAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CONFRONTATION 
16 AND CROSS-EXAMINATION, BUT I THINK THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE 
17 LAW WERE MET IN THIS REGARD IN ADVISING HIM OF HIS 
18 CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. AND I THINK HE UNDERSTOOD THOSE AND 
19 I THINK HE VOLUNTARY ENTERED A PLEA OF GUILTY. IF HE'S 
20 CHANGED HIS MIND NOW AND THINKS HE MAY HAVE A BETTER CASE 
21 NOW, THE LAW DOESN'T REQUIRE THAT HIS PLEA BE WITHDRAW 
22 BECAUSE HE HAS A BETTER CASE NOW THAN HE DID THEN. SO 1 
23 WILL DENY YOUR MOTION. 
24 MS. MOWER: THANK YOU. MAY WE HAVE FINDINGS OF 
25 FACT, PLEASE? 
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